Access to Medicines and the TRIPS Agreement: What Next for Sub-Saharan Africa? by Sundaram, Jae
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & 
Francis in Information & Communications Technology Law, 24:3, 242-
261, on 18 September 2015, available online: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2015.1084679 
1 
 
 
Access to Medicines and the TRIPS Agreement: What Next for Sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
Jae Sundaram* 
 
When the trade ministers signed the TRIPS agreement in Marrakesh in the spring 
of 1994, they were in effect signing the death warrants on thousands of people in 
sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the developing countries. This is one of the 
reasons that TRIPS has generated such immense concern. - JE Stiglitz1  
 
Abstract 
When the proposal for an international intellectual property (IP) rights protection was 
included as an item in the agenda for negotiation in the Uruguay Round of World Trade 
Organization negotiations, it was strongly opposed by developing countries including Brazil, 
India, Argentina and others. The developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs) 
from Africa, realising the difficulties the Agreement would put them in, had vigorously 
campaigned against the inclusion of IP rights protection within the multilateral trading system. 
One of the chief areas of concern for the developing countries and LDCs was the difficulty of 
accessing affordable medicines under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) regime. While the resistance was gradually eroded and eventually neutralised 
during the long drawn Uruguay Round of Negotiations, the developing countries and the LDCs 
gained a few concessions in the post-TRIPS era in the form of Doha Declaration, which in 
their opinion would have given them the opportunity to invoke the emergency provisions of the 
Agreement in times of need to access essential medicines for their citizens. This was not to be 
the case, as the ground realities were difficult to manoeuvre and there were more impediments 
to invoking the flexibilities than originally perceived. This article will suggest that the best 
option available for sub-Saharan Africa is seeking an outright amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement, as working within the parameters of the Agreement to achieve the goal of access 
to affordable medicines is not a viable option. It will also be argued that unless it acts urgently 
to seek the amendment it may be too late, as it could find itself left behind by both developing 
countries from other continents and patent holding developed countries alike.       
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1 Introduction: Negotiations 
This article takes up for analysis the continued problems faced in access to medicines 
in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-TRIPS (The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights) era, and the way forward. It is well documented that the African 
countries along with developing countries from other continents were opposed to the 
introduction of an IP protection even during the Uruguay Round of Negotiations; the proposal 
went ahead, regardless of the oppositions, resulting in the introduction of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The articles studies the reasons behind the continued inability of the sub-Saharan 
African States in accessing affordable medicines, the difficulty or failure of sub-Saharan 
African countries to utilise flexibilities found in the TRIPS agreement, and also raise the 
inevitable question as to what is keeping the sub-Saharan African countries from seeking an 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to remove pharmaceutical patents from the ambit of its 
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operation. This article is divided into three parts, with the first part presenting the entry of the 
TRIPS Agreement, the flexibilities, the introduction of Doha Declaration in later years, and the 
continuing problems faced by sub-Saharan African countries with regard to access to 
medicines, the second part providing the background to the current state of affairs as regards 
access to medicines in sub-Saharan Africa and the measures taken to find solutions. The second 
part will also identify the factors contributing to the continued failure of the sub-Saharan 
African countries to find a viable solution to the problems. The third part will focus on 
discussing the findings and suggesting the way forward to arrive at a permanent solution to 
counter the shortcomings of TRIPS Agreement and the consequent problems. 
 
2. TRIPS Agreement: Troubled Passage and Entry 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is 
viewed as the most significant agreements to emerge out of the Uruguay Round of 
Negotiations2 and yet controversial of the covered agreements of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The TRIPS Agreement, which addresses a range of IP rights issues and mandates a 
global minimum standard for IP rights protection on all member countries, was drafted at the 
behest of patent rights holding developed countries.3 It has far-reaching implications on 
international intellectual property rights protection and access to medicines in developing 
countries and LDCs. The expression ‘access to medicines,’ although widely used, does not 
have a standard definition. The main reason the Agreement is considered as a serious threat to 
access to medicines is that the 20-year product patent protection introduced through the 
Agreement covers pharmaceutical patents,4 and also outlaws process patents. Process patent, 
as opposed to product patent paved the way for affordable generic drugs and is much more 
affordable than patented/brand name drugs produced by transnational pharmaceutical 
corporations.5 Interestingly, most sub-Saharan African countries rely on generic drugs,6 which 
are free of patent and hence cheaper and affordable.  
The TRIPS Agreement7 allows Member States to impose a more extensive protection 
 
2 See C Fink, ‘Intellectual Property and the WTO,’ (World Bank, November 2004) 
<http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Internal-Training/287823-
1116536061368/IPR-WTO_Fink.doc> accessed 20 March 2015. The TRIPS Agreement marked a clear departure 
from the narrow negotiations on border measures such as tariffs and quotas commonly encountered during the 
GATT negotiations, toward the establishment of multilateral rules for trade-affecting measures beyond borders, 
and came into force on 1 January 1995.  
3 See generally, SK Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights 
(Cambridge, 2003). 
4 Under the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property 1883, contracting parties were permitted to 
exclude patent protection in certain sectors such as pharmaceuticals, and permitted to determine the duration of 
patent rights, and grant compulsory license for a variety of reasons. Most of these flexibilities are not available 
under the TRIPS Agreement.  
5 India, seen as the leading manufacturer of generic drugs in the world, introduced process patent into its legislation 
in the 1970s, which helped in the production of cheaper medicines to its own use and for export to other developing 
countries and LDCs. Pharmaceutical products became patentable in France and Germancy in 1967, in Italy in 
1979 and in Spain in 1992. See J Sundaram, ‘India’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Compliant Pharmaceutical Patent Laws: What Lessons for India and Other Developing Countries?’ Information 
& Communications Technology Law Vol. 23 Issue 1 (2014) 1-30. 
6 Generic drugs contain the same active ingredient as the original brand name product (patented) upon which it is 
based. Generics are identical to the branded product, provided it is well made. Also, good generics are an 
affordable alternative to the more costlier brand name products. See MNG Dukes, FM Haaijer-Ruskamp, CP de 
Joncheere, and AH Rieteld (eds.) in Drugs and Money: Prices, Affordability and Cost Containment (WHO, 2003) 
103. Note, the World Health Organization (WHO) has avaoided the use of the term ‘generic product’ as much as 
possible, and in its place chosen to use the term ‘multisource pharmaceutical product.’  
7 The TRIPS Agreement came into force on 1 January 1995, and is one of the covered Agreements of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Importantly, the TRIPS Agreement is a far more stronger Treaty than any earlier 
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of IP right if they wish to, and a minimum standard of protection from others who may not be 
in favour of an extensive protection. TRIPS Agreement fully incorporates substantive rules 
contained in other international agreements and Conventions8 previously administered by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).9 Developing countries and least developed 
countries (LDCs) had little or no involvement in the development of the above IP 
Conventions/treaties, as most were negotiated in the colonial era,10 decades before the Uruguay 
Round of Negotiations that took place in the 1980s-1990s. It is worth pointing that a number 
of sub-Saharan African countries were made signatories to international Conventions even 
during the colonial period, without the need for them to be parties.11 The Agreement creates 
rights for producers of intellectual property and obligations for the users, and speaks very little 
about the rights of the end-users of intellectual property,12 in our case the rights of the 
consumers of such pharmaceutical products. The developing countries, led by India, Brazil, 
and Argentina strongly opposed the proposal,13 which was followed by a detailed paper 
submitted by India in July 1989 at the negotiations putting forward the developing countries’ 
 
international Conventions, in that it is allows for Member Sates to raise disputes before the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) for non-compliance of the minimum standards laid down under the Agreement. Both the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 (under Article 28(1)), and the Berne Conventions 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1883 (under Article 33(1)) refer disputes to the International 
Court of Justice, unless the countries involved in a dispute agree on some other method of settlement. 
8 The Paris Convention 1883, and The Berne Convention 1883, were designed to enhance the degree of protection 
that patent rights holders from developed countries enjoyed in overseas jurisdictions. See C Deere, The 
Implementation Game: The Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries (OUP, 2009) 
53. These two treaties were also aimed at replacing the loose network of reciprocal intellectual property 
arrangements that European colonial powers had in place in some of the bilateral commercial treaties in the 19th 
century.  
9 T Cottier, ‘The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ in PFJ Macrory, AE 
Appleton, and MG Plummer (eds) The World Trade Organisation: Legal Economic and Political Analysis Vol. I 
(Springer, New York, 2005) 1041-1122, 1043. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, ‘Resource Book on TRIPS and 
Development’ (2005) 3. Before the entry of TRIPS Agreement, international intellectual property rights were 
overseen through a patchwork of treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
including the Paris Convention on Industrial Property and the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works. 
See also J Sundaram, ‘Brazil’s Implementation of TRIPS Flexibilities: Ambitious Missions, Early 
Implementation, and the Plans for Reform’ Information & Communications Technology Law Vol. 23 Issue 2 
(2014) 81-116. 
10 C Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property 
Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford, 2009) 8.  
11 Through the mechanism of Article 19 of the Berne Convention the former colonial powers of Britain, France, 
Italy, Belgium and Spain included their colonies in the accession to the Convention. The original Article 19 of the 
Berne Convention 1886 reads: “[1] Countries acceding to this Convention shall also have the right to accede 
thereto at any time on behalf of their colonies or foreign possessions. [2] They may for this purpose make either 
a general declaration of adhesion that includes all their colonies or possessions, or expressly indicate only those 
which are included, or which are excluded.” See Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971), WIPO Publication No 615 (E), ISBN 92-805-0002-3 (1978) 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/615/wipo_pub_615.pdf> 23 March 2015.  
12 See, e.g., A Kur and HG Ruse-Khan, ‘Enough is Enough - The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International 
Intellectual Property Protection’ Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law, Research 
Paper Series No. 09-01, (2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429> accessed 23 March 2015. 
13 J Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries, (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
21. See generally P Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting’ 
(2002) UK Intellectual Property Rights Commission Study Paper No 8 
<https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/reports/pdfs/UKCommIPRS.pdf> accessed 23 March 2015. The author 
points out that during the Cold War, the LDCs had the benefit of India and Brazil’s leadership of a broad coalition 
of developing countries, whose importance faded away gradually. The author also observes that the main reason 
for developing countries not being able to influence outcomes in international IP standard setting process is the 
continued use of webs of coercion by the US and EU, both of which remain united on the need for strong global 
standards of intellectual property protection.  
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reasons for opposition for inclusion of an international IP rights protection to the GATT 
agenda.14 Although debated, the paper presented by India15 did not produce the desired effect, 
as towards the latter half of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 almost all developing countries 
changed their position on the inclusion of international IP rights protection to the GATT 
agenda,16 which effectively brought the curtains on any resistance to the introduction of an 
international IP rights protection regime in the multilateral trading system.  
 
1.2 The TRIPS Agreement: Flexibilities, The Doha Declaration & Sub-Saharan Africa 
The TRIPS Agreement, by strengthening patent protection, had a significant impact on 
access to life-saving medicines in developing countries and LDCs.17 This had especially 
affected the poor countries that had no infrastructure to produce pharmaceuticals and solely 
relied on imported generics for their health care needs.18 The TRIPS Agreement, most 
importantly, contains flexibilities in its implementation, which are primarily aimed at 
benefitting the developing countries and LDCs,19 and help them in the pursuit of access to 
affordable medicines. Scholarly articles written on the subject of flexibilities contained in the 
TRIPS Agreement, points to the WTO’s failure to address the problem of the access to 
medicines in developing countries and LDCs.20 Some of the key pharmaceutical patent-related 
flexibilities identified include provision for grant of compulsory licensing, parallel importation, 
and provisions relating to patentable subject matter,21 the exhaustion of rights22 and parallel 
 
14 UNCTAD-ICTSD, ‘Resource Book on TRIPS and Development’ (2005) 6. 
15 Ibid 7. India had all along argued that any principle or standard relating to IPRs should be carefully tested 
against the needs of developing countries, and that it would be inappropriate to focus the discussions on the 
protection of the monopoly rights of the owners of intellectual property, when almost 99 percent of the patents 
were owned by industrialised nations. It urged that the group focus on restrictive and anti-competitive practices 
of the owners of intellectual property rights and evolve standards and principles for their elimination to avoid 
distortion of trade. It also stressed that substantive standards on intellectual property were more in the realm of 
socio-economic, industrial and technological development, especially in the case of developing countries. 
16 The shift came about due the coercive strategies adopted by the United States, and as a result India found itself 
isolated in the negotiations. RC Bird & DR Cahoy, ‘The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons from Intellectual 
Property Negotiation and Enforcement’ 5 NW J Tech & Intell Prop 1 (2007) 400, 403-04; J Watal (n 14). For a 
detailed account of the TRIPS negotiations, see DJ Gervais, ‘Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The 
State of Play’ Fordham Law Review, Vol. 74 (2005) 505-535. See also F Weitsman, ‘TRIPS, Access to Medicines 
and the “North-South” Conflict After Doha: The End or the Beginning?’ Asper Rev In’l Bus & Trade L Vol. 67 
(2006) 67-102, 78. The author opines that from the very beginning, the developing countries (which would also 
by default include the LDCs) had no real choice in the negotiations but to succumb to the pressure of developed 
countries.  
17 A Lewinberg, ‘Access to Medicines Guide: Guide for Policy Makers and Researchers: Understanding the 
challenge - Making Essential Medicines Available to the World's Poor’ (Toronto: Centre for Innovation Law and 
Policy, 2003) as cited by F Weistman in ‘TRIPS, Access to Medicines and North-South Conflict After Doha: The 
End or The Beginning?’ Asper Rev Int’l Bus & Trade L. Vol 67 (2006) 67-102, 87. 
18 Ibid. 
19 World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Patent Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework 
And Their Legislative Implementation at the National and Regional Levels,’ Committee on Development and 
Intellectual Property, Fifth Session, WIPO (25-30 April 2010).  
20 J Sundaram, ‘Analysis of TRIPS Agreement and the Justification of International IP Rights Protection in the 
WTO’s Multilateral Trading System, with Particular Reference to Pharmaceutical Patents’ ahead-of-print (2015) 
1-43. 
21 SF Musungu and C Oh, ‘The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They Promote Access 
to Medicines?’ South Center (2006). The authors study the TRIPS flexibilities from the perspective of access to 
affordable medicines. 
22 The TRIPS Agreement under Articles 6 and 28(6), and the Doha Declaration under Article 5 (d) allow Member 
States to determine the scope and extent of exhaustion of patent rights (also known as ‘first-sale’ doctrine). This 
position is strongly disputed by the US Delegation to the Council of TRIPS, as it holds the view that Article 6 of 
the TRIPS Agreement neither allows WTO Members to avail themselves of dispute settlement in relation to 
questions involving parallel imports, nor authorised parallel imports (Delegation of the United States, Council for 
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importation, scope of patentability and optional exclusion, exceptions to patent rights and 
enforcement.23 Not all developing countries were aware that the developed countries (the 
advocates of a wider global IP rights protection) had a strong public health care system and 
will be unaffected by the pharmaceutical patent regime of the TRIPS Agreement,24 and that it 
will be the developing countries and the LDCs who will be left to face the enormous burden of 
a higher IP rights protection. As the public health challenges became explicitly linked to the 
regulation of international trade25 conducted through the WTO, it was becoming increasingly 
clear that the Agreement would severely restrict access to essential medicines for their citizens, 
and impede any efforts to control diseases including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. 
There was a lingering fear amongst the developing countries (including the Sub-Saharan 
nations), that the inclusion of pharmaceutical patents under the extended IP rights protection 
of the TRIPS Agreement was likely to increase dependency on brand name pharmaceutical 
products and affect them severely, resulting in essential medicines becoming unaffordable and 
beyond their reach.26   
To complicate matters the flexibilities afforded under the Agreement to the developing 
countries and the LDCs were viewed narrowly by patent holding developed countries, which 
took the view that the only flexibility afforded under the Agreement was its staggered 
implementation in certain cases. This was in stark contrast to the view of the developing 
countries that the Agreement did not limit their sovereign powers when addressing domestic 
health crises, such as HIV/AIDS.27 The impact of the TRIPS Agreement on public health in 
developing countries and LDCs became a serious issue. It will not be out of context to point 
out that a lack of clarity and consensus on the TRIPS flexibilities had hampered the efforts to 
widen access to antiretroviral (ARVs) treatment in developing and least developed countries,28 
which factor affected the sub-Saharan African nations severely.29 The concerns of the 
 
TRIPS Meeting of June 1822, 2001, JOB(01)/97/Add.5, Council for TRIPS, 28 June 2001). See also WIPO (no 
44); CM Correa, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries’ in PJ Macrory and others (eds.), The World 
Trade Organisation: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis Vol. II (Springer, 2005) 447. 
23 Deere (n 10) 75. The author suggests the development of national policies on utility models, disclosure of origin 
of genetic material and prior informed consent, and traditional knowledge (folklore and cultural heritage were 
also mentioned).  
24 Sundaram (n 20). 
25 SJ Haakonsson and LA Richey, ‘TRIPS and Public Health: The Doha Declaration and Africa’, Development 
Policy Review Vol. 25, Issue 1 (2007) 71-90.  
26 Sundaram (n 9) 5. Access to essential medicines is recognised as an indispensable part of the right to health and 
is viewed as a non-delegable obligation on the part of the State, and cannot be violated based on lack of available 
resources. ‘The Selection and Use of Essential Medicines’ WHO Technical Report Series 914 (2002) 
<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4875e/s4875e.pdf> accessed 29 April 2015. The developing countries 
and the LDCs were apprehensive that the TRIPS Agreement if given effect to could severely restrict access to 
essential medicines within their jurisdictions and also impede any efforts to control diseases, including HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria. 
27 For the role played by India on behalf of the developing countries during the negotiations, see generally, J 
Sundaram, ‘India’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Compliant Pharmaceutical Patent Laws: 
What Lessons for India and Other Developing Countries?’ Information & Communications Technology Law Vol. 
23 Issue 1 (2014) 1-30.  
28 DOHA+10, TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to Antiretroviral Therapy: Lessons from the Past, Opportunities for 
the Future, UNAIDS, ISBN: 978929173914 (2011) 6. 
29 Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS in the world today. In 2013, 35 million people were 
living with HIV/AIDS worldwide, of which 24.7 million were from Sub-Saharan Africa. This region also accounts 
for almost 70% of global total of new HIV infection. In the same year, 1.1 million people died of AIDS related 
causes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most shockingly only 37% of patients in Sub-Saharan Africa receive antiretroviral 
treatment (ART). See UNAIDS, ‘Factsheet 2014’ (UNAIDS 2014) 
<http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/documents/20141118_FS_WADreport_en.pdf> (accessed 12 June 
2015). See also SJ Haakonsson and LA Richey (n 25). The authors points out that most ARVs are patented, and 
its high costs in developing countries limits its access to a very few programme, and relatively few people.       
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developing countries (including the African countries) only intensified when the US and EU, 
along with the transnational pharmaceutical corporations commenced an aggressive campaign 
against countries that proceeded to take advantage of the IP rights policy options contained in 
the TRIPS Agreement,30 with the most notable legal action being launched against the Republic 
of South Africa, which sought to amend its Medicines Act and grant unbridled powers to the 
government to issue compulsory licenses and parallel importing contracts to generic producers 
of HIV/AIDS drugs.31 The campaign against the South African government continued, and 
would only come to an end when the NGO protesters threatened to disrupt the political 
campaign of the then US Vice President Al Gore.32 Nevertheless, the patent holding 
transnational pharmaceutical industry persisted with its litigation, and would only withdraw 
after the NGOs had inflicted public relations damage.33 The case not only prised open the 
debate on the precise meaning of the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement, but also 
the principles and objectives embodied in Articles 7 and 8 of the Agreement.34  
With growing pressure from the African Group, the Council for TRIPS35 in June 2001 
considered in detail the relationship between public health and TRIPS Agreement.36 In 
November 2001, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health37 (Doha Declaration) was 
made, to address the concerns of the developing countries, and also to clarify other divergent 
views held by the developed nations and developing nations on the application and ambit of 
the TRIPS Agreement.38 The Doha Declaration recognised the right of a Member States to 
 
30 FM Abbott, ‘The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting A Dark Corner at the 
WTO’ Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 5 (2002) 469-505, 471. 
31 Ibid. This involved a private litigation by 39 transnational pharmaceutical corporations against Nelson Mandela 
and the South African Department of Health to delay the 1997 health reform legislation proposed by the South 
African government, and severe threats of trade and economic sanctions against the government of the Republic 
of South Africa. See also SS Marcellin, The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents: Us Sectional Interests 
and the African Group at the WTO (Ashgate, 2013) 134; SK Sell, ‘Books, Drugs and Seeds: The Politics of 
Access,’ Prepared for the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, “The Politics and Ideology of Intellectual Property”, 
(Brussels, March 20-21, 2006) 1-80. 
32 See FM Abbott, ‘The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: Responding to 
USTR-State-Industry Positions that Undermine the WTO’, in DLM Kennedy and JD Southwick (eds.) in Political 
Economy of International Trade (CAMBRIDGE, 2002) 311-342. The author in the concluding paragraphs 
observers as follows: ‘The United States has gone to an extreme, threatening to impose trade sanctions on 
developing countries that attempt to address one of the worst public health crises ever faced by human 
civilization…. The TRIPS Agreement is not only about protecting pharmaceutical industry profits. It is also about 
the health of the global economy, and about the health of individuals.’ 
33 Ibid.  
34 See SS Marcellin (n 31). Besides, it also queried the appropriateness of Article 31 in general and 31(f) in 
particular. See also S Bartlett, ‘Compulsory Licenses Pursuant to TRIPS Article 31 In Light of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,’ Journal of World Intellectual Property Vol. 6 Issue 2 
(2003) 283-310.  
35 The legal basis for the establishment of the Council is found in Article IV.5 of the WTO Agreement, which 
stipulates that the Council ‘shall oversee the functioning’ of TRIPS Agreement. The Council for TRIPS is also 
charged with the monitoring of WTO Members’ compliance with their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 
See also UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (Cambridge University Press 2005) 739. 
36 In 1996 the World Health Assembly, which was mandated to report on the impact of the work of the WTO with 
respect to national drug policies and essential drugs, examined the relationship between public health and the 
TRIPS Agreement. See resolution on the Revised Drug Strategy, Resolution WHA49.14 (25 May 1996). 
37 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 
adopted on 20 November 2001 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf> 
accessed 24 March 2015. The Doha Declaration, besides providing interpretative guidance on the policy of 
flexibilities embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, also helped clarify the scope of the TRIPS Agreement. See 
UNAIDS (n 28).  
38 JT Gathii, ‘The Legal Status of Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health under the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties’ Harv JL Tech, Vol. 15 (2002) 291-317, 292-293. 
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grant compulsory licences, determine the grounds for the grant, and also define as to what 
constituted a national emergency.39 The Doha Declaration, and the 2003 Decision on 
Implementation of Paragraph 640 of the TRIPS Agreement while recognising the right of a 
country to gain access to medicines were intended to allow access to generic medicines for 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.41 Paragraph 4 encapsulated the spirit of the Declaration 
in the following words:  
 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from 
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should 
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.  
 
To a greater extent, the Declaration also for the first time recognised that IP and trade 
rules had a negative impact on access to medicines. Paragraph 3 of the Declaration states that 
‘…also recognise the concerns about access to medicines.’42 Despite a Declaration coming 
from the highest trading body, and with a UN commitments in the form of Millennium Goals,43 
much is still desired from the TRIPS Agreement in terms of access to medicines,44 as close to 
a third of the people worldwide lack affordable essential medicines due to exorbitant prices. 
The developing countries and LDCs45 still face big challenges when trying to implement the 
TRIPS flexibilities due to increased intellectual property protection introduced under the 
TRIPS Agreement,46 and through TRIPS plus provisions introduced through free trade 
agreements (FTAs).47 The Doha Declaration’s impacted the developing countries, as it has 
influenced their health policies and in particular their pharmaceutical patent legislation. To 
some extent the Doha Declaration clarified the scope of the TRIPS Agreement, provided 
interpretative guidance and political space for the use of flexibilities policy embodied in the 
TRIPS Agreement,48 but unfortunately left unresolved the key issue of exporting products 
manufactured under a compulsory license to countries without domestic production capacity, 
 
39 The 2001 Doha Declaration, and the 2003 Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the TRIPS Agreement 
recognises the right of a country to gain access to medicines. See, Council WTO General, ‘Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,’ Decision of the General 
Council [WT/L/540 and Corr.1] (1 September 2003). 
40 World Trade Organization, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1 (2003). 
41 SJ Haakonsson and LA Richey (n 25). 
42 M Childs, ‘Ten Years of the Declaration: The State of Implementation’ Médecins Sans Frontières Presentation 
at WIPO- South  Centre/ KEI side meeting (November 2011).  
43 The United Nations Millennium Development Goal (UN MDG), Target 8.E states that in cooperation with 
pharmaceutical companies, to provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries. United 
Nations, ‘Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015’ <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml> 
accessed 23 March 2015. 
44 According to 2008 figures released by the WHO, approximately a third of the people worldwide lack access to 
medicines. Further, the high prices of essential medicines act as a barrier in the treatment of millions. 
45 In the instant case the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
46 C Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property 
Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford, 2009) 8. See also United Nations, ‘The Millennium Development Goals 
Report 2013’ <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/report-2013/mdg-report-2013-english.pdf> accessed 23 
March 2015. Interestingly, the report does not list any entries under 8E of the Goals, which is aimed at providing 
access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries. 
47 The TRIPS-plus provision embedded into FTAs prove a difficult task to access medicines as it effectively 
outllaws generics and also requires exteneded protection to pharamaceutial patents beyond the period prescribed 
under the TRIPS Agreement. 
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besides not addressing the promise of increased R&D in exchange for higher levels of IP 
protection, which was used as a bargaining chip by the developed countries during the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations on extended IP rights protection.49  
If the TRIPS Agreement was a well-concerted effort by the developed countries and 
their transnational pharmaceutical corporations, then, the Doha Declaration was a hard fought 
bargain by the developing countries and LDCs led by the African nations and well supported 
by the NGOs. The lack of clarity on the use of compulsory license under the TRIPS Agreement 
still proves a major stumbling block for the sub-Saharan African nations in accessing affordable 
medicines, especially when they strongly rely on generic drugs manufactured in countries like 
India for most of their health care requirement.50 It is however to be noted that some developing 
countries have used the TRIPS flexibilities to produce and purchase generic antiretroviral 
medications, and there is also evidence of donor countries now permitting the use of their funds 
to procure generic antiretroviral medications for least developed countries.51 Unfortunately, 
most sub-Saharan African countries do not fall under the category of developing countries that 
have utilised such flexibilities to their advantage, as do they do not possess the knowledge 
economy or the necessary infrastructure to manufacture medicines on their own. The UN 
Commission on Human Rights on IP and Human Rights goes as far as to state that the WTO is 
“a veritable nightmare” for certain sectors of humanity,52 in that the TRIPS Agreement in some 
ways encourages, or has as a side-effect human rights violations.53 The observations in the 
report are true in that the sub-Saharan African countries continue to suffer from the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. The fact remains that, the most marginalised global 
economic actor at the WTO, the African faction54 did not have a major role to play during 
TRIPS negotiations,55 but arguably played an important role in the post-TRIPS era in the lead 
 
48 World Trade Organization (n 36).  
49 See E FM ’t Hoen, The Global Politics of Pharmaceutical Monopoly Power: Drug Patents, Access, Innovation 
and the Application of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (ABM, The Netherlands, 2009) 
2-3. 
50 As opposed to patented brandname drugs which come at a high price, generic drugs are affordable and cost a 
fraction of the branded drugs.    
51 The value of donor-funded developing country ARV market has had a dramatic annual growth in recent times. 
By 2008, Indian generic ARVs accounted for 65% of the total value (US$463 million) of ARV purchases reported. 
See B Waning, E Diedrichsen & S Moon, ‘A Lifeline to Treatment: The Role of Indian Generic Manufacturers in 
Supplying Antiretroviral Medicines to Developing Countries’ (2010) Journal of International AIDS Society  
<http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1758-2652-13-35.pdf> accessed 24 March 2015. 
52 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
‘Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights’, Resolution 2000/7, 17 August 2000, para 1 [Document E/CN. 
4/Sub.2/2000/2000/7]. The report concludes thus: ‘Since the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does not 
adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights, including the right of everyone to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, the right to health, the right to food and the right to 
self-determination, there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights embodied in the TRIPS 
Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights law on the other.’  
53 F Papadopoulou, ‘TRIPS and Human Rights’, in A Kur (eds.) Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair Trade 
System: Proposals for Reform of TRIPS (Edward Elgar 2011) 262. 
54 SS Marcellin (n 31) 135. The author points out that the African Group had been the most marginalized at the 
WTO until December 2005 WTO decision to amend the TRIPS Agreement.    
55 Marcellin (n 31) 80. The author observes that from the texts and proceedings of the TRIPS negotiations, one 
could gather that there was no clear engagement (submission/proposal), or a clear standpoint during the 
negotiations, from the African countries (with the exception of Nigeria and Tanzania’s submission in 1990). This 
factor is especially shocking when one takes into consideration the fact that Africa is the most affected continent 
from HIV/AIDS, and also the most to lose in an ill-conceived IP protection package affecting pharmaceutical 
patents.  
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up to the Doha Declaration.56 The African Groups raised the issue of patents and healthcare as 
part of the Doha Development Round,57 in such a way that it could not be ignored.       
 
1.3 Problems Facing Sub-Saharan Africa: Extended IP Rights Protection, the Promised 
Flexibilities and the ‘Unachievable Balance’ under TRIPS 
Improving access to affordable medicines in the disadvantaged parts of the world had 
been on the agenda of international bodies for well over four decades, and resulting in the 
adoption of numerous resolutions and declarations. In the 1980s, when the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
affected the populations across the globe, the most vulnerable populations were located in the 
developing and least developed parts of the world – needless to say the concentration continues 
to be very high in sub-Saharan Africa. While progress has been made in the treatment of the 
disease, it still remains inaccessible to a majority of the population who suffer from it. Those 
affected by HIV/AIDS but with access to the best treatment options still live in developed 
countries, and those with little or no access to medicines and treatment live in developing 
countries and LDCs, with the majority concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa.58 The developed 
countries hold the patent rights to most medicines, which offer the best treatment options 
possible for to treat HIV/AIDS. Medicines broadly fall under three categories namely, non-
prescription drugs, generic prescription drugs, and patented prescription drugs. Transnational 
pharmaceutical corporations from patent holding developed countries dominate the market for 
patented prescription drugs, which are also responsible for the development of new therapies.59  
Generic medication, which makes up for half the pharmaceutical market, developed in 
industrialized nations and released into the public domain in the 1970s,60 is the most sought 
after medicine in sub-Saharan Africa, as it is affordable and hence accessible. As mentioned 
earlier, most sub-Saharan African countries lack the necessary knowledge economy and 
research capabilities to identify and treat diseases that affect their countries, besides the 
necessary infrastructure to produce any medicines.61 This is also compounded by the fact that 
most sub-Saharan African nations also do not posses the necessary administrative and resource 
capacities to negotiate before international forums,62 which is a huge disadvantage, especially 
in a globalized economy where decisions, touching upon all aspects of human life, are taken 
on a daily basis.  
Due to reduced production costs (especially labour) prevalent in developing countries 
and LDCs, one may think that it would be possible to produce medication at a cheaper cost in 
African countries. However, this may not be the case in sub-Saharan Africa, where most 
countries are without industrial or environmental expertise, and only have limited internal 
 
56 See P Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting’ The Journal of 
World Intellectual Property Vol. 5, Issue 5 (2002) 765-89; P Drahos ‘Four Lessons for Developing Countries 
From the Trade Negotiations Over Access to Medicines’ Liverpool Law Review, Vol. 28, Issue 1 (2007) 11-39. 
See also Marcellin (n 31) 135. 
57 The Doha Development Round purported to place the needs and interests of developing countries and LDCs at 
the heart of its work programme. See Marcellin (n 31) 136. The Doha Ministerial Declaration 
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1)  (20 November 2001). 
58 Sundaram (n 20) 31.  
59 AN Elbeshbishi,  ‘TRIPS and Public Health: What Should African Countries Do?’ (African Trade Policy 
Centre, January 2007) 1.  
60 Ibid. Interestingly, in developed countries like the US, there are strong incentives to replace patented 
medications with generic medicines as soon as their patents expire.  
61 Ibid. The author points out that the pharmaceutical industry in some of African countries has evolved, which 
was motivated by the industrial politics of the 1950s. African countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Kenya and South 
Africa began to create national pharmaceutical industries to replace imports and essentially produce medications 
locally, replacing foreign imports. And although Morocco has opened the doors to transnational pharmaceutical 
corporations, others like Egypt has preferred to support locally financed enterprises. 
62 Ibid. 
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markets and cannot therefore benefit from the economies of scale as enjoyed by larger countries 
and multinational companies.63 The history of the long drawn negotiations on an expanded IP 
rights enforcement regime and the entry of the TRIPS Agreement clearly demonstrate that the 
drafters’ intent, although from different ends of the spectrum, was to balance IP rights with 
access to affordable medicines,64 with the goal to provide access to essential medications in 
cases of national public health emergency by granting a compulsory license of a patented 
medication.65 While the extent of the IP rights protection has been clearly defined in the 
Agreement, the scope of compulsory licenses has not been defined properly,66 which does not 
help in balancing the countervailing goals of IP rights with access to medicines.67 Under the 
scheme rights holders are seen as producers of goods, while individuals seeking a fairer access 
to affordable medicines are viewed as mere consumers, with both parties having deeply 
entrenched goals with differing primary priorities and interests.68 One of the major stumbling 
blocks in achieving the goal of access to medicines appear to be the need to balance the 
transnational pharmaceutical corporations’ profit-seeking behaviour with socially responsible 
business practice that will permit greater access to essential medicines,69 which clearly appears 
to favour the patent-holding pharmaceutical corporations, as there are no international 
mechanism, or national mechanisms in developing countries and LDCs to monitor their 
business practice. Also, most developing countries and LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa, lack the 
necessary infrastructure to manufacture patentable drugs,70 and would prefer a weaker IP rights 
regime71 to permit the market entry of affordable generic drugs to its citizens.  
 
1.4 TRIPS Agreement – A Bane for Sub-Saharan Africa:  
The TRIPS Agreement effectively curtails a Member State’s options, and also severely 
restricts the development policies of State players in ways that were not experienced by 
developed countries during their own transformations into industrialized countries.72 One of 
the most affected from the Agreement is the sub-Saharan African Member States, as a number 
of them do not have sufficient infrastructure to compete with developed countries in production 
of pharmaceuticals and are constrained to rely on imported medicines produced by 
transnational pharmaceutical corporations. The sub-Saharan African countries that clearly fall 
under this category have come to increasingly rely on imported and affordable generic drugs 
from outside the continent. It is necessary to point out that the trade-off as promised by the 
developed countries during the Uruguay Round of Negotiations did not happen,73 although it 
 
63 Ibid. 
64 D Gratzer, ‘The WTO’s Drug Problem,’ Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (21 January 2003) 
<http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/miarticle.htm?id=3276> accessed 31 March 2015. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 D Halajian, ‘Inadequacy of TRIPS & the Compulsory License: Why Broad Compulsory Licensing is Not a 
Viable Solution to the Access to Medicines Problem, Brook. J. Int’l L. Vol. 38, Issue 3 (2013) 1191-2013, 1192. 
The author also argues that TRIPS has not been utilized to its fullest. 
68 AG Watson, ‘International IP Rights: Do TRIPS’ Flexibilities Permit Sufficient Access to Affordable 
HIV/AIDS Medicines in Developing Countries?,’ B.C. Int’l & Com. l. Rev, Vol. 32 (2009) 143-159, 149–150. 
69 B Whobrey, ‘International Patent Law and Public Health: Analyzing TRIPS’ Effect on Access to 
Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries,’ Brandeis L. J., Vol. 45 (2007) 623-642, 623-624. 
70 DCK Chow and E Lee, International Intellectual Property: Problems, Cases, and Materials (Thomson West, 
2006) 12.  
71 Whobery (n 43) 625. 
72 S Joseph, Blame It On the WTO? A Human Right Critique (Oxford 2013) 267.  
73 RC Dreyfuss, ‘The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms 
for Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property Law Making’ IILJ Working Paper 2009/5, NYU School of Law, 
(2009) 4 <http://ssrn.com//aol3/papers.cfm?abstract=11442785> accessed 28 January 2014. According to the 
11 
 
 
is two decades since the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement into the multilateral trading 
system. To a great extent the gap in the knowledge economy between the developed and the 
developing countries (North-South divide) contributed to their ignorance of the TRIPS 
Agreement’s implication and the flexibilities offered therein,74 needless to say that the African 
nations barely engaged in the TRIPS negotiations,75 which was to prove very costly. Sub-
Saharan Africa, predominantly formed by developing countries and LDCs, is a classic case 
where knowledge economy is very nearly barren in the continent with the exception of a few 
countries, due to a number of reasons including poverty, illiteracy, long period of military 
dictatorship with no recourse to development, very poor governance, corruption, etc. Again, 
some of the diseases which are viewed as manageable and not so life threatening in the 
developed countries are still life threatening and not manageable in most parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa – the classic cases being AIDS/HIV, malaria, diabetes, etc. In sum it is the WTO, lead 
by the developed countries, which is solely responsible for creating a multilateral trading 
system that promotes private ownership of knowledge through the TRIPS Agreement.76  
The current structures and incentives of the pharmaceutical industry, which is largely 
based on IP laws, do not incentivize research into medicines for neglected diseases that afflict 
citizens living in sub-Saharan African countries, but not to be found in developed countries.77 
To address the inequality in research created by pharmaceutical corporations, some authors 
have suggested alternative schemes for incentivizing pharmaceutical research,78 to make it 
more easily accessible in developing countries and LDCs. Here again, the Ebola79 outbreak, 
which was witnessed in parts of West Africa in 2014, presents us with a snap shot of the 
urgency with which transnational pharmaceutical corporations carry out research for potential 
cure, or treatment for diseases. Although the Ebola virus was first discovered in 1976, no 
breakthrough had yet been made in 2014 when parts of West Africa witnessed a major outbreak 
of the virus, which claimed close to 5000 lives.80 The most severely affected countries of the 
 
author’s analysis the trade-off was access to foreign markets in exchange for raising domestic intellectual property 
levels, which was a losing proposition. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Marcellin (n 54). 
76 Joseph (n 70). The author opines that the TRIPS Agreement vests IP rights holders with very broad and generous 
rights at the expense of human rights, and goes on to recommend a rollback of the TRIPS Agreement through the 
grant of greater flexibility in the implementation for developing countries.    
77 Joseph (n 70) 239. The author also notes that pharmaceutical patents incentivize research directed at ‘symptom 
relief’ rather than finding permanent cures.   
78 See generally, T Pogge, ‘The Health Impact Fund: Better Pharmaceutical Innovations at Much Lower Prices’ 
in T Pogge, M Rimmer, and K Rubenstein (eds) in Incentives for Global Public Health (Cambridge, 2010) 135-
154. The author proposes an alternative scheme where the countries contribute to a ‘Health Impact Fund’ from 
where pharmaceutical innovators are paid depending on the impact of their products on health. This, in the view 
of the author would not only incentivize products which cure diseases, but would also encourage lower prices 
increasing the health impact of a product.  
79 The World Health Organisation (WHO) describes Ebola virus disease (EVD) as ‘a severe, often fatal illness in 
humans.’ The disease is mainly found in tropical Central and West Africa, and can have a 90 per cent mortality 
rate.  The first outbreak of Ebola was experienced in 1976 in two simultaneous locations, namely, Nzara, Sudan, 
and Yambuku, Democratic Republic of Congo. The village of Yambuku is situated near the Ebola River, from 
which the disease takes its name. See P Sawer, ‘Ebola Facts: What is it and How is it Transmitted?’ The Telegraph 
(29 December 2014) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ebola/11171600/Ebola-facts-What-is-Ebola-
and-how-is-it-transmitted.html> accessed 9 May 2015; WHO – Media Centre, ‘Ebola Virus Disease – Fact Sheet 
No 103’ (WHO, April 2015) <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/> accessed 9 May 2015. 
80 The figure of 5000 in WHO’s view, is speculative and could be three times more, bringing the death toll close 
to 15,000. T Miles ‘Official WHO Ebola Toll Near 5,000 with True Number Nearer 15,000’ (Reuters 22 October 
2014) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/us-health-ebola-who-idUSKCN0IB23220141022> accessed 9 
May 2015. The figures available as of 6 May 2015 put the death toll from 2014 outbreak of Ebola virus at 11,007. 
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Ebola outbreak in 2014, namely Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, have very weak health care 
systems, and lack human and infrastructural resources.81 To make matters worse they have only 
in recent times emerged from long periods of conflict in the region and experience instability.82 
To have high expectations of IP rights/law compliance in the above jurisdictions, as laid out 
under the TRIPS Agreement, is simply unacceptable and shocking, and makes one ask the 
question if the WTO had considered all of the arguments before giving the go-ahead for the 
implementation of the Agreement? The answer is easy to arrive at, as the negotiation history 
of the TRIPS would demonstrate that there was no level playing field in the late 1980’s and 
1990s when the extended IP protection under the multilateral trade agenda was debated. This 
brings us back to the point made earlier, i.e., the disengagement, or lack of any clear presence 
of African Group in the TRIPS negotiation process, their lack of understanding of the gravity 
of the process that would introduce a system of IP protection on them through the WTO, which 
would have a damning effect on their health care.83 It was pointed out earlier84 that sub-Saharan 
African countries are weak on knowledge economy and also lack the capacity to 
participate/represent in international forums, a factor which would make them a very 
vulnerable player in a high level negotiation debating the introduction of IP rights protection 
globally through the soon-to-be-born WTO.  
To postpone compliance to the TRIPS Agreement cannot be a solution to the problems 
facing sub-Saharan Africa.85 Currently, the LDC Member Countries are not required to apply 
most of the substantial rules of the TRIPS Agreement until 1 July 2021, and in particular, they 
have no obligation to provide any protection for clinical test data or to grant patents, including 
on pharmaceutical products or processes.86 As recently as February 2015, LDCs led by 
Bangladesh, have presented a proposal to the TRIPS Council to have their deadline extended 
for protecting and enforcing pharmaceutical patents and clinical data as long as the Member 
State remains an LDC.87 Some of the reasons stated for the extension included the lack of 
technological base and local pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in the LDCs.88 It can also 
be added that this proposal received support from a number of developing countries, developed 
countries (including the Holy See, Chile and Norway) and the WHO in the meetings held in 
June 2015, and will be taken up for further discussion when the council meets on 15-16 October 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa - Case Counts’ (CDC 9 May 
2015).  
81 WHO (n 53). 
82 WHO (n 53). 
83 Marcellin (n 54); Stiglitz (n 1). 
84 Elbeshbishi (n 60).  
85 The LDCs, under Article 65.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, were granted a 10-year of a transition period for the 
implementation of the Agreement, which included product patent protection of pharmaceutical inventions. In 2001 
pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health instructed the 
transition period relating to pharmaceutical products was extended up to 1 January 2016. It is to be noted that this 
extension was done without prejudice to the possibility of further extension of the transition period. 
86 Infojustice, ‘World Health Organization Statement on Proposed Extension of TRIPS Transition Period For 
Least Developed Countries’ (15 June 2015) <http://infojustice.org/archives/34572> accessed 18 June 2015. 
87 WTO, ‘Poorest States Seek More Time On Medical Patents, and Members Discuss Women and Innovation’ 
(WTO 24 February 2015) <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/trip_24feb15_e.htm> accessed 18 
June 2015.  
88 The proposal states that as of 2011, some 9.7 million of the 34 million people affected by AIDS/HIV live in 
LDCs, and that 4.6 million of the HIV/AIDS sufferers living in LDCs were eligible for ARV treatment in 
accordance with the 2010 WHO HIV Treatement guidelines, but only 2.5 millioin were receiving it. The proposal 
also highlights the complex challenges facing LDCs with respect to second line AIDS/HIV treatment which is 
more than twice the price of the first line regime, and third line AIDS/HIV treatment could be 15 times the price 
of first line treatment.  
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2015.89 There are currently 48 LDCs in the United Nation’s list, of which 34 are WTO Member 
States, and most importantly they are predominantly located in the sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia.90  
In the view of leading economists, the patent system is identified as giving rise to high 
cost of medicines, which in turn impedes access to lifesaving drugs for billions.91 One of the 
main reasons the transnational pharmaceutical industry was strongly advocating for an 
extended IP rights protection regime through TRIPS was that they wanted to reduce access to 
generic medicines, as the prices of generic drugs are very low and are favoured over the much 
higher priced patented drugs.92 And also, any competition with the generics drugs will drive 
down the price of the brand name drugs. Also, the lower prices in turn lowers the profits of the 
brand name pharmaceutical companies, and that it is understandable why the transnational 
pharmaceutical corporations pushed so hard and also contributed for international IP rights 
protection.93 The developed nations who advocated for a wider, global IP protection are clearly 
not affected by the rising cost of access to affordable medicines, as they have in place a robust 
health care system through which medicines are accessible to its citizens.94 Importantly, 
antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), in developed countries, have “transformed AIDS from a death 
sentence to a chronic illness and saved thousands of lives,” but in sharp contrast, in sub-Saharan 
Africa, even at the reduced price of $300 per year the drugs remain out of reach for millions 
suffering from HIV and AIDS.95 Sub-Saharan Africa is the region most affected by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, and although it boasts only 10 percent of the world’s population, it 
nonetheless accounts for 66 percent of all HIV cases and more than 75 percent of AIDS-related 
deaths worldwide.96 It is well known that ARVs are the only proven means of staving off AIDS, 
and that so many in sub-Saharan Africa do not have access to ARVs is problematic - both 
morally and medically.97 Unfortunately, for the AIDS patients living in sub-Saharan Africa, 
 
89 In June 2015, the proposal was taken up for further hearing and received the much needed support from a 
number of developing and developed countries and will be taken up for a full discussion in October 2015. The 
WHO issued a statement expressing its full support for the proposal. See Thiru Balasubramaniam, ‘WTO TRIPS 
Council: World health Organization Issues Unequivocal Support to LDC Transition Period for Pharmaceutical 
Products’ (Knowledge Ecology International, 10 June 2015) <http://keionline.org/node/2244> accessed 18 June 
2015.  
90 World Trade Organization, ‘Understanding the WTO: Least Developed Countries’ (WTO 2015) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm> accessed 15 June 2015. With the exception 
of Timur-Leste, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, the rest of the LDCs are located in 2 continents.   
91 J Stiglitz, ‘Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights’ Duke Law Journal Vol. 57 (2008) 1693-1724, 
1701.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid. 
94 Sundaram (n 20). 
95 ‘Paying the Price’ (Television Trust for the Environment, U.S. Release 2002) <http://tve.org/films/paying-the-
price/index.html> accessed 20 June 2015; McClellan (n 190) 154. See also DT Jamison, JG Breman, AR 
Measham, G Alleyne, M Claeson, DB Evans, P Jha, A Mills, P Musgrove, ‘Cost-Effective Strategies for the 
Excess Burden of Disease in Developing Countries,’ in Priorities in Health (World Bank, 2006) 59-95. 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7045/364600Prioriti101OFFICIAL0USE0ONL
Y1.pdf?sequence=> accessed 19 June 2015. The authors argue that many of the diseases and health conditions 
that account for a large part of the disease burden in low- and middle-income countries are far less common in 
high-income countries. Also, according to the authors, just eight diseases and conditions account for 29 percent 
of all deaths in low- and middle-income countries, namely, TB, HIV/AIDS, diarrheal diseases, vaccine-
preventable diseases of childhood, malaria, respiratory infections, maternal conditions, and neonatal deaths. 
96 Jamison et al (91) 61. 
97 A Fint, HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: Politics, Aid and Globalization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 185. The 
author portrays the transnational pharmaceutical corporations as the ‘ready made villains’ in the HIV/AIDS story, 
for making billions of dollars in profits whilst people across sub-Saharan Africa died. The author further points 
out that the African HIV/AIDS crisis has revealed itself as a ‘complexity of interrelated actors, institutions and 
practices lacking both clearly identifiable ‘villains’ and simple solutions.’ 
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the ARVs for frontline treatment are inaccessible due to its exorbitant price, which is fixed by 
transnational pharmaceutical corporations.98 Patients from sub-Saharan Africa suffer most 
from the impact of TRIPS, as the implementation of the Agreement has seen the price of 
patented drugs rise exponentially in a very short time, defying any logic.99 The only option 
available for countries in sub-Saharan Africa is the use of generics, the procurement of which 
has now become highly problematic due to restriction placed on parallel imports and 
compulsory licensing under the Agreement. It will not be an exaggeration to state that the 
production and procurement of generics has almost been outlawed by the implementation of 
the TRIPS Agreement. One should bear in mind that the rules regulating the governance of 
multilateral trade are key to the future of HIV/AIDS treatment across the globe, particularly in 
poorer regions, sub-Saharan Africa being one, where price concerns can mean the difference 
between life and death.100 The extensive sufferings witnessed in sub-Saharan Africa due to 
HIV/AIDS over the decades have prompted some to refer to the region as ‘ground zero’ of 
HIV/AIDS.101  Some writers even refer In essence, the TRIPS Agreement has struck a discord, 
and only made access to life saving medicines an even more difficult task to achieve in sub-
Saharan Africa and other disadvantaged parts of the world. 
 
2. The Existence of Medicines does not Guarantee Treatment 
Some writers have identified poverty as one of the main reasons for not being able to 
access medicines, and even those governments that are not corrupt or otherwise woefully 
dysfunctional, lack the resources and infrastructure to get them to those who need medicines 
but cannot afford them.102 This particular factor is used by the pharmaceutical industry to stave 
off any argument that patent rights allow them to set high prices that keep life-saving drugs out 
of the reach of the poor.103 In the 21st Century globalised economy, the existence of medicines, 
 
98 Ibid. The author opines that the role of transnational pharmaceutical companies in HIV/AIDS management is 
controversial, which is due to the increased protection afforded to the IP rights of their products. See also 
UNAIDS, Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS Staff, 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (World Health 
Organization 2006) 13-14. The Report states that millions have died of this terrible disease - 2.6 million in 2003 
and 2.8 million in 2005, of which sub-Saharan Africa contributed 1.9 million and 2.0 million respectively. 
99  Sundaram (n 20). 
100 Fint (n 97). The author also points out that the extension of IP rights protection to pharmaceutical patents across 
the globe has cemented the transnational pharmaceutical corporations’ control over the international 
pharmaceutical market and, with it, their ability to control prices and access. See also HA Waxman, 
‘Pharmaceutical Industry Profits Increase by over $8 Billion after Medicare Drug Plan goes into Effect’, 
Committee on Government Reform, US House of Representatives, (September, 2006). The author points out that 
in 2006, the American-based pharmaceutical conglomerates of Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co, Eli Lilly 
& Company, Proctor & Gamble, and Bristol-Meyers, collectively and other top ten economic pharmaceutical 
performers produced profits of nearly $40 billion in an international market worth close $640 billion. 
101 Fint (n 97) 169. 
102 G Dutfield, ‘Delivering Drugs to the Poor: Will the TRIPS Amendment Help’ Am JL & Med, Vol. 34 (2008) 
107-124. See L Ferreira, ‘Access to HIV/AID Drugs: The Human Rights Obligations of Multinational 
Pharmaceutical Corporations’ Fordham L Rev Vol. 71 Issue 3 (2002) 1133-1180, pp.1133-1135. The author 
argues that poverty is a potent cause of death in developing countries with significant poor population, and that a 
vast proportion of patients in developing countries may die because the medicines to control the progression of 
diseases are unaffordable. See also EFM ‘t Hoen, ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential 
Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond’ in Economics of AIDS and Access to HIV/AIDS Care in Developing 
Countries: Issues and Challenges (Agence Nationale de Recherches sur le SIDA (ANRS), 2003) 39-67. The 
author argues that the important reason for the lack of access to medicines in many cases is the high prices of 
drugs, which acts as a barrier to much needed treatments, and that prohibitive drug prices are often the result of 
strong IP Protection. 
103 Ibid. See also T Jones, Commentary, in Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights: Report of 
the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (World Health Organization, 2006) 
202, where it is observed that “Concerning access, patents are not the issue but the overwhelming poverty of 
individuals, absence of state healthcare financing, lack of medical personnel, transport and distribution 
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or cure, does not guarantee their accessibility to the poor and needy in developing countries 
and LDCs, who were compelled to embrace an intellectual property regime under the TRIPS 
Agreement, which is to their absolute disadvantage.104 The idea of withholding (or denying 
access to) life-saving drugs from individuals suffering from fatal or debilitating diseases when 
the means exist to distribute those drugs cheaply and effectively is anathema to all notions of 
morality.105 Under international human rights laws, the right to health includes elements related 
to healthcare – which includes access to medicines, curative and preventive health care, and 
other aspects related to a number of ‘underlying preconditions for health.’106 The Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) interpreted the understanding of the 
‘highest attainable standard of health’ as “a right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, 
good, services and conditions necessary for the realisation of the highest attainable standard of 
health,”107 and access to necessary medicines should be understood in light of this explanation.  
Authors haver argued that the TRIPS Agreement cannot be viewed as just, and 
highlighting the fact that representatives of a number of acceding governments included 
individuals such as Suharto (Indonesia), Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Sani Abacha (Nigeria), Mobutu 
Sese Seko (Democratic Republic of Congo), and Burma’s SLORC junta, who could not have 
represented the best interests of the people they were ruling.108 By globalizing the 
pharmaceutical patent regime the developed countries have imposed a very costly loss of 
freedom on the global poor coming from developing countries and LDCs, thereby cutting off 
poor patients from their generic drug supply and exposing billions of vulnerable people to 
heightened risk of death and disease.109 It can be argued that pharmaceutical patent holding 
developed countries have used the TRIPS Agreement to effectively set a bench-mark on IP 
rights standards and have exploited the loop-holes in the multilateral trading system, which 
allows for regional trade agreements (RTAs), to effectively prevent the developing countries 
from implementing the TRIPS flexibilities.110  
 
2.1 The Proposal for An Amendment 
In the preceding paragraphs we identified some of the disadvantages that blight the sub-
Saharan African countries from accessing affordable medicines. One of the disadvantages 
identified is the lack of manufacturing capacity and, or the economic viability to either produce 
active ingredients, or formulations. This particular factor disadvantages the sub-Saharan 
African countries to the most as it deprives them from availing the provisions of ‘compulsory 
 
infrastructure plus supply chain charges which can make affordable originator or generic products unaffordable. 
In many countries, medicines are unaffordable from whatever source, price or patent status.” 
104 Sundaram (n 20). 
105 T Pogge, ‘Access to Medicines’ (2008) 1(2) Pub Health Ethics 73–82, 74. The author refers to TRIPS as a 
‘notorious’ Agreement, which had globalised a monopoly patent regime, which keeps the prices of advanced 
medicines much higher than the long-run cost of production by suppressing generic competition. He also argues 
that this excludes the global poor from access to vital medicines for the sake of enhancing the incentives to develop 
new medicines for the affluent.  
106 Ibid, 75. The author argues that the current international rules, which are shaped by developed/wealthier 
countries, contribute to massive deprivations among the disadvantaged, and are therefore unjust, and those 
responsible for the design and imposition of the said rules are not merely failing to protect human rights, but are 
actively violating the rights of billions. 
106 B Toebes, ‘Towards an Improved Understanding of the International Human Right to Health,’ Human Rights 
Quarterly Vol. 21 No 3 (1999) 661-679, 665-71;  
107 See Council on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESR), General Comment No 14, 22nd Sess, (4 July 
2000) para 9 [Document E/C.12/2000/4]. 
108 Pogge (n 105) 76. 
109 T Pogge, ‘Medicines for the World: Boosting Innovation Without Obstructing Free Access,’ SUR – Int’l J on 
Hum Rts Vol. 8 (2008) 117-140. 
110 Sundaram (n 20). 
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licenses’ under the TRIPS Agreement. Also, the option of importing generic medicines from 
other countries is restricted in the Agreement, as it requires production under compulsory 
licence to be predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.111 It would be pertinent here 
to discuss the implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration and the proposed 
amendments to the Agreement made in 2005. Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration reads as 
follows:  
 
WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory 
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
Recognizing the above problem, the Council for TRIPS was directed to find an 
expeditious solution, and to report back to the General Council before the end of 2002. After 
nearly two years of negotiations, on 30 August 2003,112 the General Council of the WTO finally 
adopted the Decision on Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (the August Decision). The paragraph 6 solution was essentially 
an interim waiver with regard to the obligations under 31 (f) and (h)113 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which allows for the total quantity of drugs produced under a compulsory licence 
to be exported. This waiver envisaged under paragraph 6 shall terminate on the date on which 
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for a member.114 
Any implementation of the Decision will require carrying out changes to national laws, and 
also ensuring that countries do not assume TRIPS-plus obligations under bilateral or regional 
trade agreements (RTAs).115 Since August 2003, the Council for TRIPS had met annually to 
review the implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, and as per paragraph 8, 
‘with a view to ensuring its effective operation, and shall annually report on its operation to the 
General Council.’116 On 6 December 2005 the WTO Member States reached an agreement on 
 
111 Sundaram (n 20). 
112 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health WT/L/540 
(30 August 2003) <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm> accessed 20 June 2015. 
113 Article 31 – Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder: Where the law of a Member allows for 
other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the 
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected:…(f) any 
such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such 
use;….; (h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization. 
114 A waiver in this regard does not imply any change of substantive treaty obligations; it only temporarily 
suspends their operation (Article 57 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). A WTO waiver means 
that a Member shall not initiate a complaint against another Member if the latter acted under the terms of the 
adopted waiver. However, to the extent that a Member’s national law is not revised to implement the terms of the 
waiver,
 
patent owners may invoke provisions in the national law to block the export of a patented drug by other 
companies. D Matthews, ‘WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the DOHA Declaration on the 
TRIPs Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?’ Journal of 
International Economic Law Vol. 7 No.1 (2004): 73-107. See also CM Correa, ‘Implementation of the WTO 
General Council Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,’ 
Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy, (WHO, 2004) 7. 
<http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/68743/1/WHO_EDM_PAR_2004.4_(2).pdf?ua=1> accessed 21 June 
2015. The author notes that bilateral agreements established by the US with some developing and developed 
countries (e.g., Australia, the Central American countries, Chile, Jordan, Morocco) require the protection of data 
under a sui generis regime of data exclusivity for at least five years from the date of the first approval of a 
pharmaceutical product in the country. 
115 Correa (n 114).  
116 Sundaram (n 20). 
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the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement,117 and this proposal, if and when given effect to, will 
make the temporary waiver of Article 31(f) of the Decision taken on 30 August 2003, a 
permanent feature. Any decision to review the TRIPS Agreement can only be enforced if the 
protocol to amend the Agreement is accepted by a two third majority of the Member States, 
and the WTO will keep the said Protocol open for acceptance by Member States until 31 
December 2015. Worryingly, such changes to the TRIPS Agreement will only take effect for 
those Members States who have signed up for an amendment. For each of the remaining 
Member States, the waiver will continue to apply until that member accepts the amendment. 
 
3. Discussion & Conclusion  
With a mere five months to go, only 58 Member States (as of 29 July 2015) have desired 
an amendment of the Agreement,118 out of which there are only 8 countries from sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is a worrying development, as a number of the sub-Saharan African countries that 
are being affected (and who will be affected even more in the coming months and years), have 
not expressed their wish for an amendment to the Agreement. Given the fact what is sought to 
be made permanent is the temporary waiver brought under paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration, which will pave the way for exporting and importing generic drugs under the 
compulsory licensing provision of the TRIPS Agreement it is a real concern that there is very 
little engagement in this regard from the developing countries and LDCs. This clearly 
demonstrates, not an indifference towards the issue, but an ignorance of the magnitude of the 
problem that the TRIPS Agreement had brought about in the access to medicines in the 
developing countries and LDCs.  
The feeble voice one hears from the sub-Saharan Africa is not for free medicine but a 
deafening cry for access to affordable medicines. It should be seen as the failure of the WTO 
to develop an adequate solution to the AIDS issue, which is emblematic of a broader truth about 
global intellectual property rights and the developing world.119 To a greater degree, the WTO, 
as an agency of the United Nations (UN) and the world governing body that administers the 
TRIPS Agreement, should be made accountable in its failure in not finding an effective solution 
to access to medicines in most of its Member States,120 and more particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The argument that Doha declaration was especially formulated to address this issue, 
and that flexibilities were built into the TRIPS Agreement to address the specific issue cannot 
be sustained, as they have proven to be ineffective in most cases. Most of the sub-Saharan 
African countries suffer due to lack of access to medicines, but a mere 8 Member States121 from 
the region have expressed their desire for an amendment.122 Sadly, a majority of the countries 
 
117 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement: Decision of 6 December 2005, World Trade Organization [WT/L/641 
8 December 2005]. It is to be noted that the TRIPS Agreement had never been amendment since its entry on 1 
January 1995. 
118 See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, ‘Members Accepting Amendment of 
the TRIPS Agreement,’ WTO (2014) <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm> accessed 
30 July 2015. 
119 P Drahos and J Braithwaite, ‘Three Tests of US Trade Policy on Intellectual Property Rights’, Nth Position 
(July 2003) <http://www.nthposition.com/threetestsofustrade.php> accessed 31 May 2015. 
120 Sundaram (n 20). 
121 The following countries have signed up for an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement: Botswana (18 June 2014), 
Central African Republic (13 January 2014), Kenya (21 July 2015), Rwanda (12 December 2011), Senegal (18 
January 2011), Togo (13 March 2012), Uganda (12 July 2010), and Zambia (10 August 2009). The list is correct 
as of 29 July 2015. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, ‘Members Accepting 
Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement,’ (n 118).  
122 It should be noted that the African Continent is still in the grip of HIV/AIDS and most number of deaths are 
still reported in Africa than in any other Continent in the world. The non-availability of affordable ARVs still 
remains as the main problem in the fight against HIV/AIDS. 
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in sub-Saharan Africa rely on generic drugs for treatment, and do not possess the necessary 
infrastructure to manufacture any generic drugs that they need for frontline treatment. Africa 
as a continent will stand to benefit through a full support of the amendment to the TRIPS 
Agreement from its WTO Member States. It is yet to be seen if the 31 December 2015 deadline 
will come to pass, or if the proposed amendment, as in the past, will get another extension.  
Some authors while advocating for a review of the TRIPS Agreement, argue that the 
agenda should include the ‘question of its removal from the WTO so that the trade organisation 
can return to its mission of promoting balanced trade options.’123 This suggestion presents a 
strong argument, as it is predicated on the premise that the WTO had deviated from its main 
objective of balanced trade options, and that the TRIPS Agreement has not worked for the 
majority of the Member States of the WTO. Viewed from the sub-Saharan African countries 
interest, it is definitely a way forward, as neither is making the waiver under Article 6 a 
permanent feature of the TRIPS Agreement going to solve the problem permanently, nor is the 
proposal to the TRIPS Council to have their deadline extended for protecting and enforcing 
pharmaceutical patents and clinical data as long as the Member State remains an LDC, going 
to solve the larger problem created by an extended IP rights protection granted to 
pharmaceutical patents. One should realise that the WTO had created a beast in the TRIPS 
Agreement and until and unless its ill effects are neutralised through a complete amendment to 
exclude protection for pharmaceutical patents from its ambit, the problems facing sub-Saharan 
Africa and other disadvantaged countries around the world with regards to access to medicines 
will not go away. The current study had looked at the negotiation process where the African 
countries made very little contribution, and later in the post-TRIPS era the African countries 
showed leadership and made a positive contribution in the discussions in the lead up to the 
Doha Declaration. While the efforts and contributions from the African countries during the 
Doha Declaration is laudable, their silence, or inaction to sign up and seek an amendment to 
the TRIPS Agreement to make the temporary waiver under Article 6 of the Doha Declaration 
into a permanent feature of the TRIPS Agreement is deafening. Time is running out for sub-
Saharan Africa (and other LDCs too), and unless it acts fast, the problem of access to medicines 
it faces will not go away, and the TRIPS Agreement in its current form could make it a 
permanent feature.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
123 M Khor, ‘Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights and TRIPS’ in P Drahos and R Mayne (eds), Global 
Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development (Palgrave Macmillan 2002) 201–13, 212. 
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